Daniela Coelho

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Accounting at the University of Iowa. I use my background in law as a lens for understanding the decisions of capital market participants. My research is shaped by my career at the Federal Prosecutor's Office (Brazil) and by graduate training in regulation and in accounting and finance. Together, these experiences taught me to see contracts, regulation and enforcement as institutions that define incentives, constraints, and information environment in which firms and investors operate. Building on this view, I study the design and effectiveness of the regulatory framework governing financial markets.

Research

Noncompete Agreements and Career Choices: Implications for the Accounting Profession (job market paper)

A talent shortage in accounting threatens financial reporting integrity. This study asks whether noncompete agreements affect the allocation of talent into accounting programs. Accountants already face unusual labor restrictions, and noncompetes further limit their job options and negotiating power. I find that when noncompetes become easier to enforce, top accounting graduate salaries fall relative to other business fields, and fewer students choose accounting as a major, with enrollment declines concentrated in states where accountants face fewer outside employment options. Results imply a 13.1% to 15.6% decline in the total number of accounting students in affected states, an effect comparable in magnitude to the impact of the 150-hour rule, indicating that noncompetes are an economically meaningful factor influencing the supply of accountants. Overall, noncompetes help explain shifts in accounting enrollment.

Presentations: AAA/Deloitte/J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium (2026); BYU Accounting Research Symposium (2026); University of Iowa (2025).

Noncompete Agreements and Professional Independence (with Fabio da Costa and Cristi Gleason)

Reliable financial reporting depends on accountants exercising independent professional judgment, but their employment contracts may undermine that independence. We ask whether noncompete agreements, by limiting accountants’ outside options, weaken their ability to push back against managerial pressure. When noncompetes become easier to enforce, firms are more likely to issue major financial restatements. We also find a decline in whistleblowing claims, indicating employees are less likely to report corporate wrongdoing. Together, these results suggest noncompetes constrain accountants’ independence and erode reporting reliability.

Court Transparency and Corporate Litigation Reporting (with Jedson Pinto and Gil Sadka)

Investors rely on litigation disclosures to assess legal risk, but firms vary widely in what they reveal about pending lawsuits. Does court transparency itself shape what firms disclose? Using a large language model to analyse litigation disclosures across over 42,000 annual reports, we exploit the staggered rollout of online court record systems to show that once court records become publicly accessible, firms disclose litigation more often, in more detail, and recognize related costs earlier. Our findings suggest that judicial transparency spills over into corporate reporting.

Presentation: Conference on Empirical Legal Studies at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law (2026)

Political Connections and Corporate Distortions: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (with Cristi Gleason)

Political connections can destroy shareholder value, as connected actors may exercise influence to misuse corporate resources. But is this driven by personal ties or by government ownership itself? We study a law banning politicians from serving as officers or directors of publicly listed government-controlled firms, without changing the state’s ownership stake. After the ban, these firms invest more efficiently, borrow more cheaply, and perform better financially. Results suggest personal political ties, not state ownership, drive value-destroying behaviour, strengthening the case for laws limiting politicians’ direct corporate roles.